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Abstract 
Purpose 
Drawing on a cost-benefit perspective, this paper explores the relation between information asymmetry 
and the decision to delist from stock exchanges during periods of uncertainty. Specifically, it 
investigates the role of firms’ intangible investments and the availability of alternative sources of 
finance on the decision to delist from foreign stock markets. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
The study takes advantage of a natural experiment in which cross-listed Chinese firms facing 
uncertainty in US markets due to widespread allegations of accounting fraud, decide on whether to 
remain listed or voluntarily delist. Here, the decision to delist is modeled as a function of the level of 
information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders, and the availability of alternative 
financing, while controlling for other drivers of firms’ delisting decision. The data used in the empirical 
analyses covers a hand-collected sample of 91 Chinese firms voluntarily delisting from US stock 
markets between 2010 and 2016. This sample is matched with an equal sample of Chinese firms, which 
remained listed in US stock markets during the same period. A probit regression model accounting for 
fixed-effects is used. The study also uses probit model interaction effects to capture the mediating effect 
of alternative financing on the intangibles-delisting nexus. 
 
Findings 
There is a significant positive relationship between investments in intangible assets and firms’ decision 
to delist. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the positive intangibles-delisting nexus is accentuated 
by the availability of alternative sources of financing. Collectively, the results are consistent with the 
theoretical argument that the higher information asymmetry associated with intangible assets may 
increase the cost of staying listed on stock exchanges, particularly, in periods of uncertainty (captured 
in this study by accounting fraud allegations targeting cross-listed firms). The results have important 
implications for corporate managers, capital market participants, and policy makers. 
 
Originality/Value 
The study exploits a unique natural experimental setting to explore why cross-listed firms delist. The 
underlying theoretical framework to explain delisting is new. This framework captures the role of 
information asymmetry, uncertainty and alternative financing in explaining the cost and benefits of 
remaining listed on a foreign market. 
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1. Introduction 
The liberalisation of capital markets, as well as, technological progress over the last three decades 
has created new opportunities for firms to seek development and growth beyond their national borders. 
Prior studies (see e.g., Merton, 1987; Stulz, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Karolyi, 2006; Bharath 
and Dittmar, 2010; Eng and Ling, 2012) have explored the motivations of foreign firms listing in US 
stock markets. The extant research suggests that foreign firms cross-list into the US market to gain 
access to lower cost of capital (Errunza and Miller, 2000; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010), greater investor 
recognition (Merton, 1987), or as a commitment mechanism to the stricter US regulations and investor 
protection rights (Stulz, 1999; Karolyi, 2006; Eng and Ling, 2012). Clearly, besides stricter regulations, 
there are other costs associated with listing on more sophisticated markets, most notably, greater 
information disclosure requirements (Eng and Ling, 2012) and increased scrutiny by stakeholders such 
as analysts and the press. While the extant research explores the motivations underlying firms’ listings 
in foreign markets, it is unclear how these associated cost influences delisting decisions. The case of 
cross-listed Chinese firms in US markets provides a natural setting to explore this issue. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission, established in 1992, allowed Chinese firms to cross-
list. This led to a surge in the number of Chinese firms listing in foreign markets, particularly in the US. 
As in Figure 1, the number of Chinese firms listing on US markets increased successively each year 
from 2001, reaching its peak in 2007. Noticeably, Chinese firms’ listings on US markets significantly 
reduced to 11 in 2011, representing a 96% decline from the previous year. Concurrently, as shown in 
Table 2, a wave of voluntary delisting also emerged.1 Recent figures suggest that between 2010 and 
2015, there were over 80 delisting announcements from US stock exchanges involving Chinese firms. 
This wave of delisting has been attributed to loss of investor confidence following reports of fraudulent 
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accounting practices in some Chinese US-listed firms (Song and Zeng, 2012).  
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Notably, a survey report released by Muddy Waters Research Company in June 2010 suggested 
that some US-listed Chinese firms (e.g. Orient Paper) were involved in fraudulent financial reporting. 
Similarly, Citron Research reported accounting fraud and bribery scandals involving Evergrande Real 
Estate Group (a high profile Chinese firm). Even though these claims were unsubstantiated, Evergrande 
Real Estate Group lost HK$8 billion of its market value. Arguably, these scrutiny, allegations, exposure 
and suspicion relating to accounting fraud instigated a mass exodus of Chinese firms from US stock 
markets (see Song and Zeng, 2012; Liu et al., 2016; Zhang, 2012). Interestingly, some Chinese firms 
maintained their US listing. 
The case of Chinese firms delisting from US exchanges between 2010 and 2016 creates a natural 
experimental setting to explore the decisions of cross-listed firms under uncertainty. This article, 
therefore, examines whether firms with a higher perceived cost of cross-listing embark on delisting for 
precautionary reasons. Here, the paper utilises firm-level intangible investments (which capture the 
level of information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders) to proxy for the level of scrutiny that 
firms potentially face when investors suspect accounting fraud. Drawing from the cost-benefit 
perspective on why firms become public (see, Maupin et al., 1984; Kaplan, 1991; Bharath and Dittmar, 
2010; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 2012), the paper argues that when investors (notably US-based) 
associate cross-listed (Chinese) firms with accounting fraud, the cost of remaining listed becomes 
asymmetrically higher for those firms with high information asymmetry (proxied by intangibles).2 
Consequently, it is posited that the presence of intangible assets increases (reduces) the costs (net 
benefits) of being listed on overseas’ markets, resulting in a higher propensity to delist in times of 
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uncertainty (i.e., when cross-listed firms are susceptible to accounting fraud allegations). To corroborate 
this benefit-cost argument, the paper considers how the delisting decision is shaped by a firm’s 
propensity to secure alternative private funding.  
The present article contributes to the scant but growing literature on public-to-private transactions 
(PTPs) by providing evidence that possibly explains why cross-listed firms faced with uncertainty 
respond differently, i.e., some remain listed while others delist. Thus, the study’s analysis documents 
the fundamental drivers (beyond the investor confidence crisis) of firms’ voluntary delisting decisions. 
Moreover, it contributes to this PTPs literature which has largely focused on transactions of firms in the 
advanced economies of the US and the UK, often using dated data (see, e.g. Renneboog et al., 2007; 
Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Pour and Laser, 2013), with empirical studies on firms from emerging 
economies like China being rare.3  
This paper relates to, but also differs from recent research by Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) 
and Pour and Laser (2013). Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) examine the factors motivating foreign 
firms to delisting from US stock exchanges over the period 1962-2006, while the current article 
specifically considers the delisting decisions of Chinese firms from US markets for a more recent period 
(2010-2016) when there was a foreign investor confidence crisis. Similarly, Pour and Laser (2013) 
analyse the motives and market valuations of voluntary delisting from the London Stock Exchange 
during 1995-2009. They mainly focus on firms’ capital structure rebalancing as a driver of their delisting 
decisions, whereas the primary focus of the current study is on the role of intangible assets in driving 
the delisting decisions of Chinese firms from US stock exchanges. Focusing on intangible assets is 
important given the increasing prominence of intangible assets vis-à-vis investments in capital 
expenditure by firms in recent years (Anagnostopoulou, 2008; Borisova and Brown, 2013). For 
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example, Borisova and Brown (2013) report the ratio of R&D spending to total assets in 2008 to be 
around 10% compared to a capital expenditure ratio of about 4% for publicly listed companies with 
coverage in the Compustat database.             
The results, based on a probit analysis of 91 voluntary delisting announcements by Chinese firms 
listed on US markets during the seven-year period, 2010 to 2016, and a carefully selected control 
sample, show that investments in intangible assets are a significant driver of firms’ voluntary delisting 
decisions, after controlling for other determinants of the delisting decision. Specifically, the results show 
a delisting probability of 11% for an average firm in the sample that undertakes average levels of 
intangible investments. The paper further finds the delisting probability to be even higher, ranging from 
20-22%, for those firms with the topmost intangible investments (e.g. firms with above-median or top 
25% investments in intangibles). Moreover, the evidence suggests that firms with higher intangible 
investments are more likely delist from stock markets when they have alternative sources of financing 
such as a prior successful equity issue or a thriving internal capital market.  
The results align with the article’s proposed theoretical framework. The framework contends that 
the higher information asymmetry and valuation challenges associated with intangible investments 
(Anagnostopoulou, 2008) increase (decrease) the costs (net benefits) of remaining listed on stock 
exchanges, particularly when there is market uncertainty. The results are consistent with prior studies 
(e.g. Maupin et al., 1984; Kaplan, 1991; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 2012) 
suggesting that firms tend to consider both costs and benefits in making their delisting decisions. Finally, 
the results have important implications for corporate managers, capital market participants, and policy 
makers.         
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the context of the study and 
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develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and empirical methods. Section 5 presents and 
discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
  
2. The impact of accounting fraud on investor confidence 
2.1 US analysts and accounting fraud  
One of the features of becoming a public firm in advanced economies is the intense media and 
analysts’ coverage/scrutiny (Eng and Ling, 2012). These analysts together with the press play an 
important role as an information intermediary in financial markets by often identifying corporate 
financial malfeasance and broadcasting them. Miller (2006) describes them as the “watchdog” of 
corporate America. Existing research on the relations between information intermediaries (e.g. the 
press, analysts, etc.) and commerce suggests that these “watchdogs” do not only shape public 
perceptions of firms, but they also have a significant influence on financial market participants 
(Zingales, 2000; Jensen, 1979; Miller, 2000). Miller (2000) shows that in 29% of the cases of accounting 
violations that he studied in his US sample, the press had published articles regarding accounting fraud 
prior to a public acknowledgment by the firm or US Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
markets reacted negatively in most cases. He concludes that the press, through its exposure of 
accounting fraud, actually provides investors with valuable information, especially when their reports 
are backed by some investigations/research.  
Prior literature suggests that analysts’ and press reports on accounting irregularities in public 
corporations adversely affect the fortunes of the public firm through loss of reputation (Karpoff et al., 
2008), and ultimately, substantial decreases in stock prices (Feroz et al., 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; 
Miller, 2000). This suggests that besides the upfront cost of going public (e.g. admission fees), firms 
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face additional risk/cost of intense scrutiny, particularly in relation to potential accounting fraud. 
Clearly, these additional costs may eventually outweigh the benefits of remaining listed (for example, 
in periods of high uncertainty), motivating some listed firms to delist. 
 
2.2 Recent US analysts’ reports of accounting frauds in listed Chinese firms 
High-profile allegations of accounting fraud involving Chinese firms in US stock markets in 2010 
and 2012 increased levels of uncertainty and, perhaps, the fraud-related listing cost, for this particular 
group of firms. The first major allegation was published on 28th June 20104 by Muddy Waters Research 
LLC (Muddy Waters), a US privately-held investment firm that specialises in conducting investigative 
research and due diligence on public companies. Muddy Waters reported of egregious accounting fraud 
in Orient Paper Inc. (ONP)5, a Chinese company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and boldly 
concluded as follows: “We are confident that ONP is a fraud. Its purpose is to raise and misappropriate 
tens of millions of dollars.” The report cited specific accounting irregularities including ONP 
overstating its 2008 and 2009 revenue by 27 and 40 times respectively, overvaluing its assets by at least 
10 times, and misappropriating approximately US$30 million since October, 2009, among others. The 
report concluded with a “strong sell” recommendation. This incident did not just cause substantial 
damage to ONP, but it also heightened market fears that other Chinese public corporations may be 
involved in similar fraudulent accounting practices (Zhang, 2012).  
Two years later (on 21st June 20126), Citron Research, a US-based analyst, made another high 
profile financial fraud allegation against Evergrande Real Estate Group Limited (Evergrande), a public 
Chinese firm. Citron Research claimed that: “…Evergrande is essentially an insolvent company that 
has consistently presented fraudulent information to the investing public”. The report detailed that 
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Evergrande used bribery of local government officials and various “accounting tricks” to hide its 
insolvency, and that a total write-down of RMB 71 billion is required to move the company’s reported 
equity from RMB 35 billion to negative RMB 36 billion. While the report was unsubstantiated, on the 
day of the accounting fraud allegation, the company’s share closed 11.4% down, compared to only a 
1.3% decline on the market index. The allegation wiped-off over HK$8 billion from Evergrande’s 
market value, causing panic among some Chinese public companies and possibly motivating them to 
exit US stock exchanges (Liu et al., 2016). What followed these allegations was a reduction in the 
number of Chinese firms listing on US stock exchanges and a concurrent increase in the number of 
voluntary delisting.  
 
3. Related literature and hypotheses development  
3.1 Why do firms delist? 
The extant literature advances several reasons to explain firms’ decision to delist. Firstly, from an 
agency perspective, managers with free-cash flows and low growth prospects might chose to waste cash 
on non-value-increasing projects (Jensen, 1986; Elmagrhi et al., 2017). Delisting can curb agency 
conflicts by paying out excess cash or leveraging to repurchase stock (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
Kieschnick, 1998). Secondly, from a governance perspective, powerful CEOs might delist, possibly, to 
avoid the intense scrutiny and regulation associated with being a public firm (Weir et al., 2005a; Weir 
et al., 2005b; Manuela and Giovanna, 2012).  
Thirdly, from an information asymmetry perspective, managers may choose to delist when they 
perceive their stock as being undervalued, limiting their ability to raise finance (e.g. Maupin et al., 1984, 
Renneboog et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2005b). Firms have also been shown to delist for pragmatic reasons, 
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e.g., low trading volumes in US markets, the ability of home markets to meet capital their capital needs, 
and increased cost and complexity of US market regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Marosi 
and Massoud, 2007; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2012; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Pour and Laser, 
2013). 
 
3.2 The role of intangible investments in corporate delisting decisions and hypotheses  
Firms, perhaps, evaluate the net benefit of remaining listed in a dynamic context where both firm-
level and country-level (both home and foreign) factors change over time, when deciding whether to 
remain listed. Within this context, the allegations of accounting fraud involving Chinese firms listed on 
US markets may have increased investors’ uncertainty over the true value of Chinese public firms, 
particularly, for firms with high levels of difficult-to-value intangible assets. Chinese firms, within this 
context, also face heightened uncertainty due to increased scrutiny by analysts who may provide wrong 
forecasts (Anagnostopoulou, 2008). These information asymmetries and uncertainties reduce investors’ 
willingness to fund investments, and consequently reducing firms’ access to new equity and/or 
increasing their underlying cost of capital. This paper argues that this tension, partly, offsets the 
expected benefits of remaining listed on US markets. 
Empirical evidence on the role of intangible assets on corporate delisting decisions is rare in the 
US- and UK-focused literature, and virtually non-existent for emerging economies. The few studies that 
include R&D or intangibles in their analysis have them as control variables to proxy for information 
asymmetry, and report mixed results. For example, Pour and Laser (2013) provide weak evidence for a 
positive association between intangible assets and firms’ delisting decisions, but Bharath and Dittmar 
(2010) and Marosi and Massoud (2007) find that the estimated coefficients for intangible asset ratios 
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are insignificant, implying that information asymmetry is not a factor in the delisting decision. 
The current article contributes to this literature by hypothesising that, within the context of 
heightened uncertainty in US stock markets over Chinese public firms following recent series of reports 
of accounting fraud, the levels of intangible investments played a crucial role in Chinese firms’ decision 
to delist from the US stock exchanges. This is primarily because firms’ intangible investments, within 
this context, impede their ability to issue new equity at a reasonable cost (i.e. one of the benefits of 
being listed), thereby, shaping their overall costs and net benefits of remaining listed. By their very 
nature, intangible investments attract greater analyst coverage and are more susceptible to analyst 
forecast errors, thereby, having serious consequences on firm valuations (Anagnostopoulou, 2008). 
Barth et al. (2001) find that analyst coverage is significantly greater for R&D-intensive firms and 
industries. Amir et al. (2003) also find analyst forecast errors to be positively related to investments in 
intangibles, demonstrating analysts’ lack of understanding of the implications of intangibles on firms’ 
future profitability.  
Further and in response to the valuation difficulties associated with intangible assets, accounting 
rules tend to be stringent on intangible investments, requirement frequent assessments and charging 
impairment losses, but also creates room for managerial manipulations of financial statements. Watts 
(2003) notes that that the current global accounting standard on goodwill and impairment (IFRS 3) 
which allows for managerial discretion may motivate managerial optimism and earnings management, 
and worsen investors’ suspicion of fraud in connection with intangible assets. Consistent with this 
prediction, Sun and Zhang (2017) find a negative relationship between goodwill impairment losses and 
bond credit ratings, suggesting that firms with goodwill impairment losses (i.e. high intangible-firms) 
obtain lower credit ratings. In an attempt to avoid credit ratings downgrade, for example, managers may 
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be motivated to understate impairment losses. Based on a sample of Australian firms, Bepari and 
Mollick (2017) report that the adoption of goodwill impairment approach (under IFRS 3) has decreased 
the frequency and the amount of goodwill write-offs that would have been required under the systematic 
amortisation regime (old standard). 
Collectively, the literature suggests that investments in intangibles are inherently risky, more 
susceptible to managerial manipulation and accounting fraud, attract greater analyst coverage, and are 
subject to greater analysts’ forecast errors. Therefore, in periods of general market uncertainty, public 
firms with higher investments in intangibles may incur greater costs of remaining listed, and are (thus) 
more likely to delist. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
H1: Investment in intangible assets is positively associated with corporate delisting decisions.   
 
3.3 Intangibles-delisting nexus: The accentuating effect of alternative financing sources 
The nexus between the decision to delist and intangible investments is likely to be accentuated by 
the availability or otherwise of alternative sources of financing for firms. For listed firms with high 
intangibles but without the ability to fund their intangible investment projects internally or from external 
debt, their net benefits for remaining listed may be relatively higher, making them less likely to delist. 
On the contrary, when firms have suitable and less costly means of financing (e.g., from accumulated 
reserves, prior equity issues, or even from banks), their net benefit of remaining listed is reduced, 
making them more likely to delist from stock markets, in periods of high market uncertainty. Since 
large, mature, and established firms tend to be able to access alternative funding sources (Muller and 
Zimmermann, 2008; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011), we expect such firms to have a greater likelihood 
to delist when they have high levels of intangible assets. Therefore, the second hypothesis is proposed 
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for testing: 
H2: The positive intangibles-delisting nexus is accentuated by firms’ ability to finance 
investments from alternative sources (e.g. accumulated profit, prior equity issues, etc.). 
 
4. Data and Methods 
4.1 Data 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, a sample of all privatisation announcements over seven fiscal years 
(2010 and 2016) by Chinese firms listed on major US stock exchanges is collected, regardless of 
whether the privatisation process completed successfully. This was to reflect the objective of 
investigating the role of intangible investments on firms’ decision to delist. It is considered that public 
privatisation announcements by firms are preceded by an earlier decision to delist. However, for 
simplicity, the paper refers to these firms making privatisation announcements as delisting firms (or 
delist sample).  
The data on Chinese firms delisting from US stock exchanges, specifically information on firms’ 
name and dates of delisting announcement, are hand-collected from three prominent Chinese financial 
web-based platforms (iMeigu, Hexun and Sina Finance).7 All the other data for the study including the 
IPO dates and financial/accounting data are collected from the Wind Financial Database.8 The search 
identified 94 US-listed Chinese companies that had publicly announced their decision to delist during 
2010-2016, an average of 13 per year. It is worth noting that Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012) report 
an average annual delisting of 16 foreign firms from US markets between 1962 and 2006. These 
statistics suggest disproportionately higher delisting announcements by Chinese firms from US 
exchanges in recent years relative to other foreign firms.  
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Due to data constraints, three of the 94 delisting firms drop out of the sample, leaving a final sample 
of 91 Chinese firms delisting from four major US stock exchanges9 over the 2010-2016 period. Table 1 
presents the distribution of the sample by stock exchange and industry of the delisting firms. Over half 
of the sample firms (58%) exit the NASDAQ, with another 32% exiting the NYSE. The remaining 10% 
of the sample predominantly delist from other OTC markets. Perhaps, the relatively less restrictive 
listing requirements of NASDAQ make it a preferred capital market for Chinese firms. Noticeably, 
almost half (44%) of the sample firms are from the Information Technology industry which generally 
tends to be R&D-intensive. This provides some early anecdotal evidence of a possible link between 
intangible investments and corporate delisting transactions. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 displays the sample distribution by year of delisting announcement, year of listing (i.e. 
IPO), as well as, by the number of trading years firms had been on the stock exchange before delisting. 
As can be seen, the highest number of delisting announcements (30) was observed in 2015, which 
coincides with the year immediately following the accounting fraud allegation by Citron Research 
against Evergrande. Similarly, the second and third highest numbers of delisting announcements were 
observed within the two-year period (2011-2012) after Muddy Waters reported of fraudulent accounting 
in Orient Paper Inc. in 2010. These statistics, perhaps, provide some basis for public opinion that the 
recent wave of delisting of Chinese firms from US exchanges is a response to the accounting fraud 
allegations involving Chinese firms. 
IPO information suggests that the sample firms were listed in US stock exchanges between 2000 
and 2014, with the highest listing in any single year (27 firms) observed in 2007. Only 17 firms (19%) 
listed on US markets after 2010 (post-ONP fraud allegations) and none listed after 2014 (post-
12 
 
Evergrande fraud allegations). Again, these statistics suggest that the accounting fraud allegations might 
have reduced the appetite of Chinese firms for US stock markets. Finally, at the time of delisting, 
majority of sample firms (almost 70%) had traded on the US markets for five years or less, suggesting 
that most sample firms may lack sufficient experience of operating in US stock exchanges.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4.2 Empirical model 
The main empirical approach of the paper is a probit regression model predicting the probability 
of a firm delisting from the stock exchange conditional on its intangible investments and a set of control 
variables. The dependent variable is equal to one for voluntary delisted firms and zero for control firms. 
Similar to previous studies (e.g. Pour and Laser, 2013), each Chinese delisted firm (delist sample) is 
matched with a Chinese firm that remained listed (control sample) on US markets based on industry, 
size, and IPO date. The final empirical analysis is based on a sample of 91 delisting firms and 91 non-
delisting controls, i.e., an overall sample of 182 observations.  
The baseline probit model for the empirical analysis is specified below in Eq. (1): 
itk
k
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where: itP refers to the probability of firm i delisting from the US stock exchange, the s represent the 
intercept ( ), the coefficient for intangible assets ratio (IAR) ( ), and for the control variables (
). The is the random error term assumed to be serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic. 1itIAR
represents a one-period lagged value of the firm’s intangible investments, the primary variable of 
interest, which is predicted to be positively related to corporate delisting decision (H1). Finally, 1kitX
in Eq. (1) represents one of the following lagged k control variables that may affect firms’ decision to 
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delist. The explanatory variables are lagged to minimize reverse causality problems and to increase the 
likelihood that causality flows from the explanatory variables to the dependent variable (endogeneity).  
The control variables are defined in Table 3. First, the number of listing years (i.e. the period 
between the IPO date and the delisting date) is included to control for two effects; the experience effect 
and the stability/financing effect. Firms that have been on the market for long may be more experienced 
in dealing with crisis and may thus be less likely to panic and exit the stock market in challenging times. 
Alternatively, these firms may represent mature, established firms with more analysts’ coverage and 
alternative funding sources (Merton, 1987; Baker et al. 2002; Lang et al., 2003), and may therefore 
have a higher likelihood to delist should they consider the cost of remaining listed to be too high. The 
financing effect is further controlled for by including additional variables that may capture varying 
aspects of firms’ ability to source alternative capital since obtaining financing is one of the primary 
reasons why firms become public (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). The financing variables include: (1) 
return on equity, proxying for current profitability, which may contribute to retained earnings for 
internal financing; (2) financial leverage to proxy for borrowing ability; (3) seasoned equity offerings 
as a proxy for firms’ attractiveness to investors and possible presence of reserves from prior equity 
issues; and (4) log of total assets as a proxy for the size of firms’ internal capital market.10 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Another set of controls included in the regression aims to account for firms’ growth prospects. 
Firms with higher growth prospects may need more funds to finance their growth opportunities and 
may thus be less willing to delist (Bancel and Mittoo, 2008; Aslan and Kumar, 2011; Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand, 2012). Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012) show that growing firms from emerging market 
economies that need external funding to support their growth are willing to incur higher costs of listing 
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in the US. This effect is captured by including the 3-year average operating profit growth rate, capital 
expenditure intensity, net assets per share, and market-to-book ratio. The market-to-book ratio may also 
proxy for misvaluation (i.e. over- or under-valuation) of the firm resulting from information asymmetry. 
Further, as discussed in sub-section 3.1, public firms potentially suffer from agency problems that 
emanate from excessive CEO power and/or free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Elmagrhi et al., 2017), and 
privatisation may serve as a tool for aligning managerial interests with those of shareholders. Therefore 
an indicator variable for CEO duality (i.e. CEOs doubling up as the Board Chair) and free cash flow 
variable are included to control for the agency effect on delisting. The free-cash flow variable may also 
pick up some alternative financing effect. Lastly, year fixed-effect is controlled for by including 
dummies for the delisting years to account for macroeconomic factors that may influence corporate 
delisting transactions. Industry fixed-effect was not controlled for in the regression model since the peer 
firms were selected from the same industries as the delist sample.  
The baseline probit regression model in Eq. (1) is modified when testing H2 and when conducting 
additional robustness checks. For example, the model for testing H2 contains an additional interaction 
term between IAR and a financing variable, as shown in Eq. (2):                           
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5. Empirical results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and bivariate analyses 
Panel A of Table 4 summarises the descriptive statistics for the study’s variables for the full sample 
and also separately for the delist and control samples. As displayed in the Table, the firms in the delist 
sample have a substantially higher investments in intangible assets compared with their counterparts in 
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the control sample. Specifically, the intangible assets as a proportion of total assets is 11% for the delist 
sample relative to 7.9% for the control sample, with the difference of 3.1% being statistically significant 
at the 10% level. This again provides early evidence in support of H1, in that, intangible investments 
seem to be positively associated with firms’ delisting decisions.  
Although the differences between the delist and control sample for the other variables were not 
statistically significant, firms that delisted from the stock exchanges generally had lower listing years, 
market-to-book ratio, profitability growth rate, free cash flow, net assets per share, and capital 
expenditure intensity. These statistics suggests that delisting firms may be more naïve (inexperienced 
in stock market dealings), undervalued, with limited growth prospects. However, delisting firms appear 
to have better prospects of obtaining alternative financing by being larger and more attractive to 
investors (due to recent success in seasoned equity offerings), as well as having greater current 
profitability and leverage levels. These patterns are largely in line with H2. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
In Panel B of Table 4, the correlation matrix for the variables is presented, and observably, there is 
a statistically significant positive association between intangible investments and delisting transactions. 
There also seem to be a positive (negative) association between corporate delisting activities and CEO 
duality, profitability, leverage, firm size, and seasoned equity offerings (listing years, market-to-book 
ratio, profitability growth, free-cash flow, net assets per share, and capital expenditure), albeit not 
statistically significant. Panel B of the table also shows low levels of correlation among the explanatory 
variables (all correlation coefficients are below 0.5), suggesting that multicolinearity may not pose any 
serious limitations on the multivariate regression analysis in the next section.         
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5.2 Multivariate analysis and discussions 
Table 5 presents the results for the probit regressions for the effect of intangibles on corporate 
delisting decisions. The marginal effects (reported in the Table), relate to the partial effect of each 
explanatory variable on the probability of delisting, and help to directly interpret the coefficients as 
probabilities (see Agyei-Boapeah, 2017; Pour and Lasfer, 2013). In Model 1, the intangible asset ratio 
(IAR) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (coefficient=0.029; p-value=0.002), 
suggesting that Chinese firms with high levels of intangible investments were more likely to delist from 
the US stock exchanges during the sample period. The marginal effect of the intangibles (IAR) is 0.011, 
implying that a unit increase in intangible investment increases the probability of delisting by 1.1%, on 
average. With the average sample firm having 9.5% of assets in intangibles, this result suggests a 
delisting probability of 11% (i.e. 0.011*9.5) for a firm undertaking average levels of investments in 
intangible assets. 
The positive relationship between intangible investments and the delisting decision is consistent 
with theoretical predictions. That is, increased levels of intangible investments appear to be associated 
with increased cost of remaining listed on stock exchanges, which emanates from an increased risk of 
financial statement manipulations by managers (Watts, 2003), greater analyst coverage (Barth et al., 
2001) as well as higher analysts’ forecast errors (Amir et al., 2003), and higher information asymmetry 
(Muller and Zimmermann, 2009; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011), leading to the 
undervaluation/mispricing of such firms (Anagnostopoulou, 2008) and potential losses to their 
shareholders (Weir et al., 2005b). In addition, the difficulties in objectively valuing intangible assets as 
well as their lack of collateral value appear to make it difficult for high-intangible firms to access capital 
from investors when the market faces heightened uncertainty. Consequently, these factors together 
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increase (reduce) the costs (net benefits) of staying listed on the exchange for high-intangible firms, 
causing them to delist from the stock exchange.  
Overall, the broad implications of the findings are consistent with the generic cost-benefit theoretic 
framework for understanding public-to-private transactions (see Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Bharath 
and Dittmar, 2010). For example, Bharath and Dittmar (2010) posit that since the decision to go public 
is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of listing, the delisting decision is also likely to be taken 
when the costs of listing exceed the benefits.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]        
In the next three Models of Table 5, tests for robustness of the results are conducted by measuring 
the primary explanatory variable, intangible investments, using different indicator variables. First, in 
Model 2, high-intangible firms are defined to include a dummy for firms with above-median intangible 
investments. Similarly, in Models 3 and 4, the definition of high-intangible firms is restricted to include 
only firms in the top 40% and 25% brackets for intangible investments, respectively. The results, 
reported in Table 5, confirm the strong positive impact of intangibles on the ultimate delisting decisions 
of firms. Specifically, the probability of delisting from stock exchanges increases by between 19-22% 
if firms are within the top tier for intangible investments. Collectively, these results offer empirical 
support for H1, as well as provide further support to the findings of previous studies (e.g. Marosi and 
Massoud, 2007; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 2012; Pour and Laser, 2013), which suggest that firms 
consider the costs and net benefits of listing in deciding whether to remain or delist from stock markets. 
Pour and Laser (2013) provide evidence to suggest that firms delist voluntarily from the London Stock 
Exchange when they fail to benefit from listing by not raising sufficient equity capital to rebalance their 
capital structure. In the US, Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) find 
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that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and the associated compliance costs are major determinants of 
corporate delisting decision by increasing the listing costs of public firms. In comparison, the findings 
of the present paper imply that listing costs (benefits) are higher (lower) for firms with higher 
investments in intangible assets.  
In terms of the control variables, firms that have been listed for more years and those with higher 
growth prospects (i.e., market-to-book value, operating profit growth, net assets per share) seem to have 
a significantly reduced probability of delisting. Also, current profitability (measured as return on equity) 
appears to consistently have a positive and significant impact on the decision to delist. These results are 
generally in line with prior studies such as Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Pour and Lasfer (2013). 
Turning attention to the second empirical issue (H2), there is evidence that the presence of 
alternative sources of financing intangible projects may influence the intangibles-delisting nexus, as 
shown in Table 6. As noted in section 4 [in specifying Eq. (2)], the IAR is interacted with each of the 
explanatory variables which could represent an alternative source of financing, namely; listing years, 
return on equity, free cash flow, leverage, firm size, and seasoned equity offerings. The results are 
reported in Models 1-6 of Table 6. First, the number of years for which a firm has been listed (listing 
years) is negative and statistically significant at 99% confidence level, implying that Chinese firms with 
more experience of the stock exchange dealings are more likely to remain listed. More importantly, the 
coefficient of the interaction term (IAR*Listing years) is positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level, suggesting that even the experienced firms decide to delist when they have high investments in 
intangible assets. To the extent that these experienced firms with greater listing history, analyst 
coverage, and market exposure are more attractive to investors and could easily obtain capital elsewhere 
(see Agyei-Boapeah, 2015), then these results provide empirical support for H2. Agyei-Boapeah (2015) 
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finds UK acquiring firms with significant experience in foreign markets to reap some financing 
advantages over their inexperienced counterparts.  
However, in Models 2-4, the interaction terms [(IAR*Return on Equity); (IAR*Free cash flow); 
and (IAR*Financial leverage)] though positive, lack statistical significance at conventional levels, and 
therefore inconsistent with H2. It is, however, possible that the current levels of profitability and free 
cash flow are not sufficient to fund intangible investment projects, thus, making firms reluctant to delist. 
Similarly, it may be that bondholders are less willing to fund intangible investments because of their 
lack of collateral value. Consequently, borrowing may not really be an alternative source of financing 
intangible assets. However, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) show that R&D projects are more likely 
to be funded from internal capital markets that are associated with large, diversified firms (Agyei-
Boapeah, 2017). Consistent with this conjecture and H2, the results in Model 5 show that high-
intangible firms are more likely to delist from stock exchanges when they are large and likely to have a 
sizeable pool of internal capital market to finance their intangible investments internally. Moreover, the 
individual effect of intangibles (without internal capital market) and firm size (without high intangible 
investments) on delisting decision are statistically negative, suggesting that even the high-intangible 
firms stay listed if they may not be able to fund their intangible investments from their internal capital 
markets. These findings offer further support for H2. 
Finally, the influence of financing from a prior equity issue on the intangibles-delisting nexus is 
considered. Reese and Weisbach (2002) find that firms raise a substantial amount of equity following 
cross-listings in the US, which helps them to build up a pool of reserves to fund future projects. 
Accordingly, H2 predicts that prior equity issues should reduce the net benefits of remaining listed, and 
thus increase the likelihood for such firms to delist when they carry high intangible assets. The results 
20 
 
in Model 6 support this conjecture, with a positive and significant positive coefficient for the interaction 
term (IAR*Seasoned equity offerings) (coefficient=0.071; p-value=0.005). This implies that when firms 
are likely to have a pool of equity capital from past equity issues, they are more likely to delist from 
stock markets when they have high levels of current intangible investments.  
Taken together, the results in Table 6 generally support the predictions of the proposed theoretical 
framework for this study which incorporates uncertainties in markets and valuation difficulties 
associated with intangible assets with the generic cost-benefit theoretic framework of studies such as 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012). That is, the information asymmetry 
associated with intangible assets increases (reduces) the costs (net benefits) of remaining listed for firms 
with high levels of intangible investments. Thus, such firms tend to delist from the stock markets to 
protect their shareholders from losses, especially when they have alternative and potentially less costly 
ways of financing their intangible investment projects.                              
 
6. Conclusion and implications 
Unlike current studies on the motives behind firms’ delisting decisions, which tend to focus largely 
on firms in developed economies and often ignoring the role of intangible assets, this study examines 
the predictive effect of intangible investments on corporate delisting decisions. In addition, it seeks to 
ascertain whether alternative sources of financing (other than raising new equity from the stock 
exchange) have a moderating effect on the intangibles-delisting nexus. A peculiar feature of the paper 
is that it is conducted within the context of Chinese firms listed on US markets and focused on delisting 
announcements made during the recent period of 2010-2016. This period is characterised by heightened 
uncertainty in US stock markets over Chinese public firms due to a series of accounting fraud 
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allegations made against Chinese public firms by US analysts. Given that intangible assets attract more 
analyst coverage/attention, and are associated with greater analyst forecast errors, as well as present 
managers with opportunities to manipulate financial statements, US-listed Chinese firms with large 
amounts of intangibles risk having their shares mispriced/undervalued and incurring significant losses. 
All else equal, such firms acting reasonably should have a greater incentive to delist from the stock 
market. 
Based on probit regression analysis controlling for a number of variables and year fixed-effects, 
and insights drawn from the asymmetric information and cost-benefit theories of listing, the results are 
summarized as follows. Firstly, the results suggest that investment in intangible assets is a strong 
predictor of corporate delisting decisions for emerging market firms cross-listing on stock exchanges in 
advanced countries. This implies that emerging market firms with large intangibles do face additional 
listing costs on advanced markets when there is greater market uncertainty relating to accounting fraud. 
Secondly, the finding indicates that the relationship between intangible assets and the likelihood for 
emerging market firms to exit advanced stock markets is contingent on the availability of alternative 
funding sources, particularly internal funding and prior equity issues. More specifically, the results show 
that the positive impact of intangibles on firms’ probability to delist is higher for larger firms with 
greater internal capital market, more listing years, and more reserves built up from prior seasoned equity 
issues. Thus, without surplus internal funds, high-intangibles emerging market firms cross-listing on 
advanced markets may be forced to accept significant shareholder losses in periods of greater market 
uncertainty. The interpretation and implications of our results are largely consistent with expectations 
of the theoretical framework, which is based on insights from the asymmetric information, and cost-
benefit theories of listing. 
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We make new contributions to the existing literature. Specifically, we contribute to the debate on 
the motivations behind the recent wave of delisting by Chinese firms from US markets by providing 
evidence to suggest that the reportage of US analysts on accounting fraud involving Chinese public 
firms may have increased the cost of remaining listed for firms with high investments in intangible 
assets. An implication of the finding is that in periods of high market uncertainty, firms with a significant 
investment in intangible assets risks destroying shareholders’ wealth if they remain listed on the stock 
exchange. Given the importance of intangible investments in promoting innovation and economic 
growth, this finding should be worrisome to policy makers. Accordingly, policy makers and standard 
setters must continue to work to improve the accounting regulations of intangible assets and to promote 
the adoption of global accounting standard across both emerging and advanced economies. Another key 
finding of the study is that the presence of alternative sources of funding helps to mitigate the listing 
costs in turbulent times. An important implication flowing from this finding is that public firms planning 
huge investments in intangibles should build up a reserve of internal funds as a hedge against any 
increased future costs of remaining listed should the market become more turbulent. Not having any 
funding reserves appears to leave public firms with no option but to remain on the stock exchange and 
reluctantly accept the underpricing of their shares. Therefore, market participants must keep an eye on 
the internal reserves of those public firms with huge investments in intangibles. 
Finally, inasmuch this paper makes important extensions to the literature, it is based on a limited 
sample and the specific context of Chinese firms listed on US markets during a period of heightened 
uncertainty due to accounting fraud allegations. Therefore, generalising the results outside this context 
should be done cautiously. Further studies could offer additional insights by utilizing a larger sample 
that considers several cases of accounting fraud allegations across countries over time for an analysis 
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that will permit generalisation to a larger extent. In addition, the focus of this paper did not extend to 
the valuation implications of the delisting firms, making it unclear whether the market considers 
delisting by high-intangible firms to be the “best” (value-enhancing) decision. This could again serve 
as a potential avenue of future research, which could utilise event-study methodologies to examine this 
issue.   
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 Table 1: Sample distribution by industry and stock exchange 
               Stock exchange  
Industry AMEX NASDAQ NYSE Other OTC Total 
Daily consumer products  3 3  6 
Energy   1 1 2 
Finance  1   1 
Healthcare 1 6 5 1 13 
Heavy industrial  3 3  6 
Information technology  29 9 2 40 
Materials  3 1 1 5 
Optional consumer products  8 5 2 15 
Public utility    1 1 
Real estate   2  2 
Total 1 53 29 8 91 
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Figure 1 - The number of Chinese firms listing 
on US stock markets from 1992-2016
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Table 2: Annual sample distribution by delisting and listing years and number of listing years 
Number of firms by delisting and listing Listing years and number of firms 
Year Delisting Listing Listing years Number of firms  
2000  2 +1 9  
2003  1 +2 10  
2004  5 +3 16  
2005  5 +4 13  
2006  6 +5 15  
2007  24 +6 4  
2008  3 +7 5  
2009  11 +8 8  
2010 6 17 +9 5  
2011 14 8 +10 1  
2012 24 2 +11 2  
2013 7 2 +12 2  
2014 4 5 +14 1  
2015 30  Total 91  
2016 6      
Total 91 91     
Delisting represent Chinese firms announcing privatisation from US markets during 2010-2016. Listing refers to firms 
undertaking IPOs. Listing years refer to the period between the IPO date and the delisting date. 
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Table 3: Variable definition 
Variables Descriptions Proxy for: Sign 
Market-to-book ratio (M/B) Market capitalisation / total asset Growth prospects/underpricing - 
Listing years Number of days between IPO date and delisting announcement date 
/ 365 
Market knowledge or experience / 
alternative financing source 
-/+ 
Intangible asset ratio (IAR) Intangible assets / total assets Intangible investments/asymmetric 
information 
+ 
Free cash flow (FCF) Free cash flow / total assets Agency costs/alternative financing 
source 
+ 
CEO duality A dummy equal to one if firm has the same person occupying the 
positions of CEO and Board Chairperson, and zero otherwise  
Agency costs + 
Capital expenditure intensity (CAPEX) Capital expenditure / total sales Growth prospects  - 
Financial leverage (LEV) Total debt / total assets Alternative financing source + 
Seasoned equity offerings (SEO) A dummy equal to one if the company raised equity capital after its 
IPO but prior to delisting, and zero otherwise. 
Alternative financing source -/+ 
Operating profit growth Average of annual growth rate for operating profit for the last 3 
years 
Growth prospects + 
Return on equity (ROE) After-tax profit / equity Profitability/alternative financing source + 
Net assets per share Net assets / number of shares Growth prospects - 
Firm size Natural log of total assets Internal capital market/alternative 
financing source 
+ 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables 
  Full sample   Delist sample (D)   Control sample (C)   Difference (D-C) 
  Mean STD   Mean STD   Mean STD   Mean 
p-value/t-
test 
Intangible asset ratio (%)  9.456 12.824  11.044 13.263  7.868 12.237  3.176 0.0949* 
Listing years  5.149 3.623  4.725 2.882  5.574 4.211  -0.849 0.1142 
Price-book ratio  2.491 4.061  2.225 4.094  2.757 4.032  -0.533 0.3776 
CEO duality  0.610 0.489  0.626 0.486  0.593 0.494  0.033 0.6506 
Operating profit growth (%)  46.517 451.252  6.691 213.432  86.342 600.631  -79.650 0.2348 
ROE (%)  1.568 51.463  6.519 39.810  -3.384 60.762  9.903 0.1951 
Free cash flow  1.418 13.864  1.308 10.615  1.527 16.548  -0.220 0.9152 
Net assets per share  4.970 7.981  4.327 5.382  5.612 9.915  -1.284 0.2790 
Leverage (%)  35.967 22.554  36.270 23.364  35.663 21.839  0.607 0.8566 
Firm size  10.555 1.399  10.580 1.152  10.530 1.615  0.050 0.8105 
Capex (%)  16.980 31.116  14.918 29.478  19.043 32.704  -4.125 0.3726 
Seasoned equity offerings   0.225 0.419   0.242 0.431   0.209 0.409   0.033 0.5969 
               
Panel B: Correlation matrix (In bold are statistically significant at conventional levels, 10% and below). 
Delist (1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Intangible assets ratio (%) (2) 0.1242 1.0000            
Listing years (3) -0.1175 0.0348 1.0000           
Market-to-book ratio (4) -0.0658 0.0649 -0.0553 1.0000          
CEO duality (5) 0.0338 -0.0719 -0.1124 0.0137 1.0000         
Operating profit growth (%) (6) -0.0885 -0.0090 -0.0782 0.0216 -0.0394 1.0000        
ROE (%) (7) 0.0965 -0.3795 -0.0714 0.1677 -0.1572 0.0770 1.0000       
Free cash flow (8) -0.0079 -0.1171 0.0794 0.1963 -0.0720 0.1093 0.4549 1.0000      
Net assets per share (9) -0.0807 0.0980 0.1787 0.0877 0.0299 -0.0299 0.1225 0.1227 1.0000     
Leverage (%) (10) 0.0135 -0.0192 0.2374 0.1827 0.0030 -0.0816 -0.1052 -0.1072 -0.0299 1.0000    
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Firm size (11) 0.0179 -0.0467 0.2480 0.1773 -0.1085 -0.0402 0.2571 0.3433 0.2794 0.2375 1.0000   
Capex (%) (12) -0.0665 0.0038 -0.0209 0.0127 0.0243 -0.0963 -0.0280 -0.2681 -0.0082 0.0571 -0.0511 1.0000 
Seasoned equity offerings (13) 0.0395 0.0116 0.1067 0.0061 0.0538 0.0965 -0.0380 -0.0791 -0.0042 0.1075 0.1563 -0.0609 
Variables are defined in Table 4. In Panel A, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. In Panel B, figures in bold denote statistical significance at conventional levels (i.e. 10% or 
below).   
 
 
 
Table 5: Probit regression analysis of the probability of delisting  
Explanatory variables 
(1) Marginal effect (2) Marginal effect (3) Marginal effect (4) Marginal effect 
                 
Intangible asset ratio (IAR) 0.0286*** 0.011       
  (0.002)        
Above-median IAR firm dummy   0.5685*** 0.224     
    (0.006)      
Top 40% IAR firm dummy     0.5018** 0.198   
      (0.018)    
Top 25% IAR firm dummy       0.4955** 0.195 
        (0.040)  
Listing years -0.0499* -0.020 -0.0483* -0.019 -0.0455 -0.018 -0.0468* -0.019 
  (0.071)  (0.093)  (0.111)  (0.097)  
Market-to-book value -0.0488* -0.019 -0.0500* -0.020 -0.0451* -0.018 -0.0426* -0.017 
  (0.056)  (0.055)  (0.091)  (0.098)  
CEO duality 0.2361 0.094 0.2062 0.082 0.1543 0.061 0.1888 0.075 
  (0.266)  (0.318)  (0.450)  (0.365)  
Average operating profit growth -0.0005* 0.000 -0.0005** 0.000 -0.0005** 0.000 -0.0005* 0.000 
  (0.054)  (0.034)  (0.040)  (0.084)  
Return on equity 0.0080*** 0.003 0.0061** 0.002 0.0061** 0.002 0.0061** 0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.023)  (0.019)  (0.014)  
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Free cash flow -0.0051 -0.002 -0.0046 -0.002 -0.0060 -0.002 -0.0058 -0.002 
  (0.568)  (0.607)  (0.501)  (0.507)  
Net assets per share -0.0228* -0.009 -0.0198 -0.008 -0.0211* -0.008 -0.0198 -0.008 
  (0.088)  (0.101)  (0.083)  (0.114)  
Financial leverage 0.0035 0.001 0.0038 0.002 0.0031 0.001 0.0028 0.001 
  (0.451)  (0.416)  (0.504)  (0.546)  
Firm size 0.0402 0.016 0.0306 0.012 0.0378 0.015 0.0412 0.016 
  (0.630)  (0.713)  (0.644)  (0.617)  
Capital expenditure intensity -0.3765 -0.002 -0.4339 -0.002 -0.3591 -0.001 -0.3730 -0.001 
  (0.333)  (0.262)  (0.350)  (0.326)  
Seasoned equity offerings 0.1212 0.048 0.1654 0.066 0.1057 0.042 0.1316 0.052 
  (0.609)  (0.491)  (0.657)  (0.575)  
Year fixed-effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
  …  …  …  …  
Constant -0.4851  -0.5059  -0.4192  -0.3751  
  (0.593)  (0.578)  (0.640)  (0.679)  
                 
No. of observations 182   182   182   182   
R-square 0.092   0.084   0.075   0.070   
The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm publicly announced its decision to delist, otherwise zero. All other variables are defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors are utilised in the 
probit regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   
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Table 6: Probit regression analysis incorporating alternative financing sources 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Intangible asset ratio (IAR) -0.0007 0.0304*** 0.0291*** 0.0131 -0.3408*** 0.0179* 
  (0.961) (0.002) (0.002) (0.369) (0.000) (0.080) 
IAR * Listing years 0.0059**       
  (0.014)       
IAR * Return on equity  0.0001      
   (0.363)      
IAR * Free cash flow   0.0007     
    (0.224)     
IAR * Financial leverage    0.0005    
     (0.220)    
IAR * Firm size     0.0356***   
      (0.000)   
IAR * Seasoned equity offerings      0.0711*** 
       (0.005) 
Listing years -0.1064*** -0.0490* -0.0504* -0.0480* -0.0535* -0.0487* 
  (0.003) (0.078) (0.071) (0.086) (0.075) (0.082) 
Market-to-book value -0.0559** -0.0428 -0.0410 -0.0611** -0.0377 -0.0443* 
  (0.034) (0.129) (0.136) (0.037) (0.197) (0.086) 
CEO duality 0.3002 0.2363 0.2177 0.2412 0.3157 0.2689 
  (0.163) (0.265) (0.308) (0.253) (0.152) (0.205) 
Average operating profit growth -0.0006* -0.0005* -0.0005* -0.0005** -0.0006* -0.0006** 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.060) (0.047) (0.073) (0.031) 
Return on equity 0.0097*** 0.0058 0.0063* 0.0101*** 0.0068* 0.0076*** 
  (0.000) (0.159) (0.052) (0.001) (0.055) (0.002) 
Free cash flow -0.0063 -0.0047 -0.0093 -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0078 
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  (0.486) (0.599) (0.333) (0.475) (0.528) (0.380) 
Net assets per share -0.0263* -0.0230* -0.0204* -0.0220* -0.0258* -0.0204 
  (0.066) (0.087) (0.098) (0.090) (0.082) (0.116) 
Financial leverage 0.0048 0.0041 0.0036 0.0004 0.0046 0.0043 
  (0.302) (0.384) (0.438) (0.946) (0.360) (0.354) 
Firm size 0.0421 0.0330 0.0274 0.0398 -0.2231** 0.0359 
  (0.617) (0.695) (0.743) (0.630) (0.023) (0.668) 
Capital expenditure intensity -0.4872 -0.3080 -0.3258 -0.4276 -0.3761 -0.4150 
  (0.218) (0.439) (0.404) (0.285) (0.339) (0.292) 
Seasoned equity offerings 0.1213 0.1032 0.0921 0.1434 0.0731 -0.3843 
  (0.618) (0.666) (0.700) (0.549) (0.771) (0.228) 
Year fixed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  … … … … … … 
Constant -0.2055 -0.4475 -0.3691 -0.3570 2.0449* -0.3478 
  (0.823) (0.622) (0.684) (0.694) (0.051) (0.705) 
         
No. of observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 
R-square 0.112 0.094 0.096 0.097 0.163 0.117 
The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm publicly announced its decision to delist, otherwise zero. All other variables are defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors are utilised 
in the probit regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
1As discussed in Pour and Lasfer (2015), a voluntary delisting is one that is initiated by a firm upon agreement with its shareholders (concurring votes from 75% of shareholders 
at a general meeting). 
2Intangible assets are more difficult to value resulting in high information asymmetry between firms and investors (see Anagnostopoulou’s (2008)’s review). International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 sets out the recognition and measuring criteria, as well as, the disclosure requirements for intangible assets, defined as identifiable non-monetary 
assets without physical form. Examples of intangible assets include computer software, licenses, trademarks, patents, copyrights, goodwill, research and development (R&D) 
expenditure, etc. 
3The few available Chinese studies are either theoretical in nature or based on single case study analysis, thus, lacking empirical analysis to provide persuasive evidence to 
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support those theories/perspectives (e.g. Liu et al., 2016; Zhang, 2012). 
4The full report can be accessed via this link: http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/content/uploads/2010/06/ONP_Report_June2010.pdf 
5Orient Paper Inc. (ONP) forms part of our control sample for the empirical analysis. ONP listed on the New York Stock Exchange on 17th December 2009 and remained listed 
as at the time of our data collection.  
 
6Detailed report can be obtained from this link: http://www.mmt.gov.hk/eng/reports/Evergrande_Report.pdf 
7iMeigu (http://www.imeigu.com/), Hexun (http://www.hexun.com/), and Sina Finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/). 
8The Wind financial database is a leading source of economic and financial data on China and Chinese firms. It integrates the most comprehensive and accurate market data, 
fundamental data, research, news, and analytics tools across all asset classes in China, and provides investment professionals with the data and insights they need to understand 
China's complex capital markets and economy. 
 
9These include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System 
(NASDAQ), and other Over the Counter (OTC) markets. 
10Dropping firm size as a control variable from the regression model did not change our results and conclusions qualitatively. We decide to include it to limit the possibility of 
omitted variable problems. More so, models including the firm size variable seemed to have higher explanatory power (as indicated by the Pseudo R-square statistic) compared 
with those without firm size. 
